"possessing the ideology of the working class." They acknowledge that not all Communists are from the working class but those who have accepted its ideology belong to it. By the same logic, the working-class character of the People's Liberation Army is fixed. The Communists say that, since the People's Liberation Army is led by the working class, viz. the Communist Party, although the bulk of the soldiers and commanders may not be from the working class, the army remains of the working class. Conversely, many workers may not possess the ideology of the working class. The Communists explain that most Chinese workers are fresh from the villages where "feudalistic ideas" abound and therefore have not had time to learn modern political ideology as it is understood by the working class. 565 668

The classification of people according to the ideology they prefer is one of the underlying principles governing the activities of Communist-sponsored organizations where membership cuts across class lines. The New Democratic Youth Corps, the Federation of Democratic Youth, the Young Pioneers, the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, the Democratic Women's Federation, the labor unions, and the study circles at schools and in factories help to disseminate Communist ideology. Participation in these mass organizations, whether voluntary or compulsory, serves to separate the individual from his family, absorbing his time and energy outside the family circle. Enforcement of the Marriage Law, principally 156 668

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF14 Central China AF14

156
668

through the promotion and supervision of the Democratic Women's Federation, encourages women to leave the confines of the family. The recruitment of candidates for institutions of higher learning and the assignment of jobs to graduates when they have completed their education also serve to uproot the individual from his immediate environment and make him dependent for advancement on the Communist regime. The weakening of family loyalty forces the individual to look toward the mass organizations sponsored by the Communists, who regard the Party itself as a desirable substitute for the traditional social structure. Since the individual relies on mass organizations for political advancement, which is the prerequisite for economic and social betterment, the mass organizations are most important for stabilization of society under the current regime. The regime exercises the power to control the career expectancies of the members of mass organizations, reward the achievement of those who work for the goals of the Party leadership, and punish with ostracism or more severe penalties those who rebel against the order. For the first time since the abolition of the imperial examination system, a main channel of social advancement has emerged. The mastery of an officially approved body of doctrine is the quickest road to social advancement. The Communist channel of social advancement leads to the selection of conformists. This state of affairs resembles, to some extent, that which prevailed in monarchical times when the mastery of dogmas

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF14 Central China AF14

contained in the classics and their commentaries was the prerequisite to success in the imperial examinations. 156 668

The Communist regime has found it necessary to promote as replacements for the old ruling group Communist-reformed and Communist-trained administrative, technical, and scientific personnel. Compared with traditional social movement, that which is in favor under the present regime does not spring from ideals embodied in Chinese culture but from expedient manipulation by the Communist Party. 668 178

The development of industry, waterway and irrigation projects, the settlement of the Northwest, and the nationalization and collectivization of many enterprises may conceivably absorb a good portion of the ambitious younger generation. If social movement continues to depend on Party loyalty, purges may be used to secure loyalty, to provide a flow of scapegoats for the many grievances which accumulate under a totalitarian system, and to furnish opportunities for advancement for the coming generation, whose continued devotion to the regime is crucial to its survival. But to date in the Central-South Region the purge of local cadres and officials at the regional level has been limited to the elimination of "old social elements" rather than to the "revolutionaries" themselves.[11]

11. Consult the study of Political Dynamics in this handbook.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF14 Central China AF14

every effort to make a marriage ceremony festive. Practical jokes were played on the bridegroom, traditional songs were sung, and the guests, particularly the men, thoroughly enjoyed themselves. The births of male children were often celebrated as were the initiations of boys into adulthood, betrothals, and the like. In modern times the government of the Republic of China has decreed certain national holidays, but these were little observed by the farm villages.

In addition to these occasions for relaxation, there were activities which interested some of the villagers and helped to vary their lives. Itinerant dramatic troupes occasionally performed, and the storyteller spinning out his tales to the villagers until very recently was often seen. The election of a headman for the village often involved political maneuvering and a town meeting. Pilgrimages to famous mountains or shrines were often undertaken in the slack agricultural season for religious reasons or purely for relaxation. Perhaps the most universal recreation was, as in all illiterate communities, gossip and desultory conversation about the weather, the crops, the iniquity of the government, local disputes, and, on their rare occurrence, lawsuits involving fellow villagers. Despite the grim struggle for survival, the average villager tended to be cheerful, self-respecting, with a robust sense of humor. He went through life with a continuous concern for his own "face" or prestige among his fellows and with the strong determination that, despite all, the fortunes of his family might steadily improve.

C. Urban Life

City life, although it meant a different pattern of work, was closely akin to life in the villages. Town

1:Stanford U. S-4,5 1956 AF14 Central China AF14

E. Changes in Patterns of Living

In the towns and cities, as in the countryside, the greatest changes in living patterns have been brought about by the network of new associations by which the regime envelops and controls the individual. Workers in various traditional crafts, merchants, industrial workers, all are organized by the Party, and it is within these groups, under the guidance of the cadres, that the urban working population is most strenuously indoctrinated. In long and frequent meetings, the city dweller is under intense pressure to manifest "correct attitudes," to show himself free of all "feudal" and "bourgeois" taint, and to demonstrate his complete comitment to Communist goals. Through these and other channels he is under continual pressure to step up his efficiency and productivity. The meetings take such a toll of his energy at the end of the working day that they are openly referred to as "fatigue meetings."[24]

668
156

City and town dwellers are also organized into street and ward units, and through these they are given further directives on the management of their lives. The townsman, more than the peasant, is open to an around-the-clock propaganda barrage. From the first call to early morning calisthenics, the radio blares in every street until late at night. There is pressure to join sports groups, study groups -- all with their ideological purposes. The major Communist holidays are celebrated in the cities with great parades and with endless speeches. Privacy, the chance to be at ease with family or friends, is rare.

---

24. Rostow, op. cit., p. 160.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF14 Central China AF14

ent: "To sacrifice the individual for the sake of the Party, for the sake of the class, for national liberation, or the liberation of mankind, even to sacrifice one's own life without the slightest hesitation, with a feeling of happiness -- this is the highest expression of Communist morality..."[9]

This is the basic principle: utter subordination of the individual to the Party. But when we examine some of the personal qualities which the Communists want, we find them linked in many ways to Chinese tradition. The good Communist is "able to love others and hate others" (a phrase from the Analects of Confucius), that is, he never injures his comrades for his own benefit but vigorously fights the enemies of the revolution. Towards his comrades his attitude is one of "genuineness and sympathy." (Analects) He "does nothing to others that he would not have done to himself." (Analects) He "grieves before all the rest of the world grieves and is happy only after all the rest of the world is happy." (Buddhist ideal of the Bodhisattva-savior, adapted by an eleventh century Confucian thinker.) He "has no individual apprehensions or private desires to obscure and pervert his investigation of things and understanding of true principles," (a restatement of the late Confucian

9. Liu Shao-ch'i "On the Training of the Communist Party Member" in Compton, op. cit., p. 110. Nivison, op. cit., p. 18, points out that this prescription is close to the classic descriptions of the traditional virtue of chung -- absolute loyalty to superiors.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF14 Central China AF14

view of purity of mind as being necessary for true knowledge.[10]

[812] 156

To attain these and other "good" qualities, the Communist, like his Confucian ancestors, is to pattern his character after approved models and to subject himself to intensive self-cultivation. In traditional China, the models of character and behavior found in the classics and histories were to be studied and followed by individuals who manifested a particular virtue, filial piety for example, were required reading. Now the Communists set up Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao as personal models; everyone is capable of attaining the great qualities of these revolutionary geniuses if he tries.[11] Even selected heroes from China's "feudal past" are recommended as models.[12] Such models are presented in fiction, in textbooks, in newspapers, and young and old are urged to emulate these heroes. In addition, "model" workers, farmers, soldiers are feted and publicized, and their pictures and idealized biographies appear in all propaganda media.

---

10. These characterizations are all from the authoritative treatise by Liu Shao-ch'i "On the Training of the Communist Party Member," translated in Compton, op. cit., pp. 108-55. The traditional sources are identified in Nivison, op. cit., p. 19-20.

11. Liu Shao-ch'i, op. cit., quoted in Nivison, p. 16.

12. Ch'en Sang, "Tang-hsing Yü Ssu Sheng-huo" (Party Nature and Private Life) in Lun Tang Yü Ko-jen (On the Party and the Individual) by Ch'en Po-ta and others, Hong Kong reprint, 1948, p. 3, cited in Nivison, op. cit., p. 76, note 16.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF14 Central China AF14

Self-cultivation consists of being unremittingly conscious of one's faults and of Communist ideals, of being ever alert, in study and action, to the recrudescence of 'bad' attitudes which are the residue of one's pre-Communist education. Liu Shao-ch'i stresses the development of consciousness in the individual; through consciousness one is free from the determining forces of history and environment and becomes capable of working creatively for the aims of the new society. This emphasis on consciousness is connected with both traditional ethics and Soviet psychology. On the one hand, it has "an obvious affinity to the Neo-Confucian notion of cultivation as freeing the individual from the tyranny of blind habit and unconscious selfish motivations."[13] On the other, it reflects the recent development of Soviet psychology; from an earlier denunciation of consciousness as "smacking of bourgeois idealism" the Russians have come to the view that "consciousness is a central process in making man capable of forging his own destinies."[14]

The list of bad qualities denounced by Communists is long; liberalism, formalism, bureaucratism, opportunism, and a dozen others are being continually denounced. How does one rid oneself of these vices? The following formula, here used against the vice of individualism, is typical:

---

13. Cf. Nivison, op. cit., p. 15.

14. Cf. Raymond Bauer, The New Man in Soviet Psychology, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1952, p. 164 and passim. The quotations are from Jerome Bruner's forword to this volume, xxii.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF14 Central China AF14

care and concern of those in authority, the people were to provide material support through taxes and labor; they were to serve their masters loyally and submissively; they were to obey the rules which custom (personalized as the wise rulers of the past) and the laws laid down for them. And in those laws the heaviest punishments were decreed for those who showed unfilial behavior in the family, or, in its political counterpart, rebellion against the state.[21]

These were the patterns of authority to which the individual was subject. His personality was formed within the family; his status in society was determined by his family's status. To understand the individual of traditional China, we must see him within this setting; to understand the changes being wrought by the Communists, we must take into account some of the tensions and dissatisfactions which the family system--particularly in its period of decay -- set up in the individual.

The role of the individual was determined by his position in the family, and he was taught to fill that particular role. For example, an older brother was held responsible for his younger brother, and was taught to be nice in play to those younger in years. The younger sons were expected to be less sober and responsible; their mothers often spoiled them. Throughout all the complex relations of the family, roles were assigned

21. The Classic of Filial Piety says, "Of the 3,000 crimes punishable by the five punishments, none is greater than unfiliality." (i.e., failure to submit to authority.) For a discussion, cf. Etienne Balázs, Le Traité Juridique du Souei-chou, Paris, 1954, p. 144.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF14 Central China AF14

and the individual's life and character were formed by the role he played. Freedom of choice and freedom to develop individuality were thus rigidly limited.[22] 593 156

The well-being of the family group was the individual's prime concern. He was committed to the work which would assure the family's prosperity; he was obliged to protect the family's reputation, for example, by paying off the gambling debts of a family member rather than have the family disgraced; to continue to live in a tense and unhappy household rather than to break away and thereby weaken the family's solidarity.

In exchange for his submission to authority and discipline in every phase of his personal life, the individual was given the basic necessities of life and the help of the family's influence in obtaining jobs, and in obtaining a bride, etc. Nepotism was sanctioned by the classics, and family members benefited when one of them rose to wealth or power.

The only social relationship which an individual could enjoy with less family interference was friendship, which was the most cherished thing in life. Many a Chinese poet has dealt with this theme. Popular novels and dramas have treated it with vividness and force. Friendship has the overtones of the elder-brother, younger-brother relationship. As John Weakland has observed, this type of relationship between individuals, self-elected, with virtual equality between the participants, is a refuge from the father-dominated, rigid hierarchy of the family.[23] 572

22. Bunzel-Weakland, pp. 47-64.
23. Ibid., pp. 137-47.

1

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF14 Central China AF14

The two patterns -- paternal domination and fraternal association -- are reflected in political life. Established governmental authority is of the paternal type; everyone is subject to the will of the emperor-father. But dissident movements are organized on the basis of the brotherly friendship pattern; the romantic rebels of Chinese novels, the organization of bandit gangs, the leadership of rebel armies are all bound together by ties of friendship and blood brotherhood.

When the old social order began to break up under the impact of modern forces, the family system was undermined and began slowly to disintegrate. Chinese critics held that the old family stifled individuality, prevented the development of individual initiative vital to modern China, and that it was a breeding ground for authoritarianism, hindering the development of democratic citizenship. They also felt that a new kind of individual was needed, and that the family system prevented its birth.[25]

The Communists are developing a new image of the individual and a new relationship between the individual and authority; in doing this they are using certain of the old family ideas and, capitalizing on dissatisfaction with the old family system, they are releasing the individual from his bonds and pushing him into a new system of human relations.

The Communists have paid particular attention to the groups which suffered most under the old family: women, particularly younger women, such as daughters-in-law, and adolescents. Bitter denunciations of the tyranny of the old family system by dramatizing its

25. Cf. Theodore Chen, "New China, New Texts," Current History, No. 19, 1950, p. 325.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF14 Central China AF14

inequities, insistence on the individual's loyalty to the Party rather than to the family -- all these measures are being resorted to in order to create new individuals suited to the needs of a Communist society. In Communist literature this new type of individual, free of the family and its "feudal" relationships, is presented as having boundless opportunities for self-development. Stories of young "heroes" who have broken away -- sometimes denouncing their "reactionary" fathers -- and gone on to make striking contributions to state and society are glorified in almost every publication.

"Comradeship," the brother-friend type of relationship, is strongly emphasized in Party and other organizations. During the long years of their suppression, the Communist leadership was bound together by "comradeship," which is continually romanticized and extolled in textbooks and other writings. This pattern of human relationships is built on an age-old Chinese ideal and is most attractive to those who suffered most under the old family system. It is used to encourage co-operation between individuals in a common task. In the textbooks it is fostered by moral tales -- a pail of water is too for Little Brother and too heavy for Big Brother, but it is easily carried by the two; a lone tree is easily shaken by the wind, but many trees standing together can withstand a heavy wind.[25]

The brotherhood-friendship pattern among top Communist leadership has subtly shifted, and Mao and the Party have begun to exercise paternal authority over subordinates and the people as a whole. Mao has taken

---

25. Cf. Theodore Chen, "New China, New Texts," Current History, No. 19, 1950, p. 325.

The family's function as an administrative unit for mutual surveillance and responsibility is now eliminated, and each citizen is responsible to the state. Family connections are no longer a means of getting jobs; these are assigned to individuals by state and Party organizations; in this way the Communists undermine what is left of the old family and strike at the age-old eivl of nepotism.

Yet, with the shattering of the old family and the assumption of its functions by the state, the individual is still urged by the leadership to work in a disciplined and co-operative way for the larger social group. The following prescription for individual behavior recalls the formulas for the activity of good members of the traditional family:[33]

> Citizens of the People's Republic are expected to engage in labor and productive activities and to place the common good above personal benefit. They must learn to be helpful and co-operative. They must work hard and submit willingly to the discipline of group life. They must always be ready to learn and to accept criticism for the purpose of improvement.[34]

It would appear, then, that the Communist government tries to adapt both patterns of individual-group relationship to its purposes On the one hand it encourages the equal co-operation pattern associated with the old image of brotherhood and friendship. On the other it increasingly subjects each individual to a type

33. Cf. Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 973 Jan. 21, 1955, pp. 31-32; "...when parents are 'counter-revolutionaries', the child should treat them as enemies."

34. Cf. Theodore Chen, op. cit., p. 324, and Weakland-Bunzel, pp. 153-54.

of authority that is reminiscent of the old all-powerful father of the family. For certain types of work, for example, team projects carried on by Party cadres, the former may be encouraged as the efficient pattern But for the masses of the population submission to absolute paternalistic authority and the subordination of the individual to the group is the ordained pattern.

E. Face

In traditional China "face" meant one's moral reputation (lien) and one's accumulated moral and material prestige in the eyes of the community (mien-tzu).[35] One's lien, or moral reputation, was solidified by adherence to the ethnical norms of society in all human dealings. One's mien-tzu could be increased by making important contacts, by acts of conspicuous generosity; but this could be done only within the role which society assigned to the individual. To "get above oneself" in a play for prestige was actually "to lose face" [tiu mien-tzu] . The widespread use of go-betweens in business, marriages, and political negotiations was a device for insuring that, in the event of failure, neither principal would "lose face." Consideration for the "face" of others was highly regarded, and, in actual behavior, care for one's own and others' "face," particularly of one's family's, was conducive to the surface harmony of Chinese social relations.

Modern Chinese critics have argued that this harmony was too dearly bought, that individual

35. Cf. Hsien-chin Hu, "The Chinese Concepts of Face," American Anthropologist, Vol. 46 (1944), pp 45-64. The word lien is more current in North China than in the Yangtze Valley and the south. In the lower Yangtze Vailley, according to Miss Hu (p. 46, note 5) mien-k'ung is used for lien.